Stability in East Asia: The US Role by Mansfield, Mike, 1903-2001
University of Montana
ScholarWorks at University of Montana
Mike Mansfield Speeches Mike Mansfield Papers
1-15-1979
Stability in East Asia: The US Role
Mike Mansfield 1903-2001
Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mansfield_speeches
This Speech is brought to you for free and open access by the Mike Mansfield Papers at ScholarWorks at University of Montana. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Mike Mansfield Speeches by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information, please
contact scholarworks@mso.umt.edu.
Recommended Citation
Mansfield, Mike 1903-2001, "Stability in East Asia: The US Role" (1979). Mike Mansfield Speeches. 1496.
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mansfield_speeches/1496
EMBARGOED UNTIL MONDAY, JANuARY 15, 1979, 2:00 P. M. 
STABILITY IN EAST ASIA: THE U. S. ROLE 
I am delighted that so many of you have joined us 
today. I particularly want to thank the two main business 
organizations represented here, and especially their lead-
ership, for their efforts in advancing public understanding 
of a major foreign pol1cy issue. Both Councils have played 
-- and will continue to play -- important roles in streng-
thening our econoreic relations. 
It is now one month since the President announced that 
the United States and the People's Republic of China had 
reached agreement on the establishment of full and normal 
diplomatic relations. Today I would like to share with you 
some of the background leading up to the President's his-
toric decision, and outline what we believe it means for the 
United States and for the world. 
Few other foreign policy issues have so long divided 
Americans as The China Question. In the 1930's, Americans 
became deeply aware and often passionately concerned with 
the tragedy and suffering of China. In the early 1940's, our 
two nations fought togethe::- against the Axis powers. 
In the late 1940's we tried, ultimately without success, to 
help the two sides in the Chir.ese civil war find a peaceful 
settlement to their conflict. 
Relations between the People's Republic of China and 
the United States reached a nadir in the 1950's. Our armies 
clashed in Korea, and at home the Chir.a issue left a 
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 32, Box 1, Folder 36, Mansfield Library, University of Montana
- 2 -
deep mark on the domestic political landscape. One of the 
tragedies of that period was the destruction of the careers 
of some outstanding Foreign Service officers because they 
reported events in Asia as they saw them. 
' The impasse in our relations with Peking persisted 
despite the emergence during the 1960's of incontestable 
evidence of serious rivalry between the Soviet Union and 
China. The United States, enmesh ed in military involve-
ment in Southeast Asia, and China, preoccupied with the 
Cultural Revolution, were unable to make progress towards 
overcoming our differences. 
1971 marked the beginning of a new phase. Across a 
vast gulf of misunderstanding and mutual distrust, the 
governments of Peking and the United States began a 
dialogue, starting with Henry Kissinger's dramatic trip to 
Peking in 1971 and President Nixon's visit in 1972. The 
Shanghai Communique of that year set a framework for our 
new relationship. 
But that dialogue was incomplete. The United States 
sti~l formally recognized the Republic of China -- whose de 
facto control encompassed on l y Taiwan and a few adjacent 
islands -- as the legal government of China. Despite this, 
we were able to begin contacts and ultimately, in 1973, even 
establish Liaison Offices in Washington and Peking. But the 
nature of the relationship with Peking remained limited 
in scope and depth by the political, legal, and economic 
implications of our lack of mutual recognition. 
Non-recognition the delicate state in which we 
dealt with Peking in the six years after the Shanghai 
Communique -- presented daily p ractical problems. Although 
both sides made major efforts to minimize these limitations, 
they became increasingly inhibiting. Discussions with 
the Chinese often foundered on the fact that in the absence 
of recognition, many activities either could not proceed at 
all or had to be conducted at a low level. Contacts were 
constrained, including those that might have produced 
greater understanding on global issues. Trade was limited, 
and opportunities often would go elsewhere. Legal problems 
hung over commercial transactions because of American 
claims and frozen PRC assets dating back to 1950. More 
importantly, not to try to mo ve forward would have been to 
risk moving backward -- a ~d b ac k ward movement in u.s.-
Chinese relations would have cai.lsed se r i ous damage to our 
global position. 
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So even before he was :naugurated , President Carter 
made his first China decision. In an act of continuity 
with two previous Presidents, he reaff i rrned the Shanghai 
Communique as the basis for our relationship, and spe-
cifically reaffirmed its commitment to work towards normal 
relations. 
We were not at all certain!at that time that we 
could indeed reach that ultimate goal. But we felt it 
essential to try, and we were prepared to take as much time 
as was necessary to achieve it on ah acceptable basis. 
With this in mind, we began discussions within the 
Administration, as well as an intensive series of consulta-
tions both with Members of Congress and with a wide cross-
section of American businessmen, scholars, and others. From 
our consultations and review, two central thrusts, and 
several specific concerns, emerged. 
These basic thrusts could not have been clearer: on 
the one hand, a substantial majority of Americans wished to 
see the United States and the People's Republic of China 
establish diplomatic relations; but at the same time, an 
equally large majority had deep concerns about Taiwan's 
future prosperity, security, and stability. We shared these 
concerns. The President decided that we would only establish 
diplomatic relations with Peking if such an action could be 
accomplished in a way that did not damage the well-being of 
the people on Taiwan or reduce the chances for a peaceful 
settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. 
Beyond these basic considerations, several specific 
concerns emerged. First, there was widespread and legiti-
mate concern over Peking's insistence that prior to nor-
malization the United States must unilaterally abrogate the 
Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan, rather than terminate 
it in accordance with its own provisions, to which the 
United States and Taiwan had agreed in 1954. Furthermore, we 
wished to establish that after normalization, even in the 
absence of diplomatic relations with Taiwan, all other 
agreements and treaties would remain in effect. 
Second, we shared with Congress and the American 
public a deep concern over the strong assertions by Chinese 
officials concerning their right to "liberate" Taiwan in any 
way they saw fit. From an American point of view, the 
peaceful settlement of the ~aiwan issue by the Chinese 
themselves was of critical i mportance; we could not move 
forward if Peking continued to talk and think about the 
Taiwan issue in such inf~ammatory terms. 
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Third, a consensus rapidly emerged, ins ide and out-
side the government, that it was essential that we continue 
a wide range of relations with the people on Taiwan on a 
nongovernmental bas is after normalization. In particular, 
these post-normalization relations would have to include 
continued sale of defensive weapons . to Taiwan. 
With these priorities emerging, I visited Peking 
in August of 1977, and Dr. Brzezinski went there in May of 
1978. We found a newly confident leadership emerging 
in Peking as a period of intense internal turmoil subsided. 
We found many points of common interest on global matters, 
although on some important issues we continued to have 
differences. Our discussions on normalization were of an 
exploratory nature. These overall discuss ions reinforced 
our view that a strong, secure and peaceful China was in the 
interest of world peace. 
In the early summer, President Carter instructed 
Ambassador Leonard Woodcock, Chief of the Liaison Office in 
Peking, to beg in a series of presentations outlining our 
views on normalization. In five meetin g s, Ambassador 
Woodcock laid out the American position. 
On September 19, President Carter me t with the new 
head of the Chinese Liaison Office in Washington, Ambassador 
Chai Zemin. Involving himself directly in the discussions 
for the first time, the President told the Chinese that we 
were ready to normalize relations if our concerns about the 
future well-being of the people on Taiwan were met. 
In completing his presentations on November 4, Am-
bassador Woodcock indicated t o the Chines e that we would be 
willing to work toward a January 1, 1979, target date for 
normalization if our concerns were met. The Chinese began 
their response in early December. In mi d-December, negotia-
tions intensified with Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping becoming 
personally involved. Finally, on December 14, we reached 
agreement that met our funda mental concerns and the an-
nouncement of our decision to establish diplomatic relations 
was made on December 15. 
We have been able to establish full diplomatic re-
lations with the People's Republic of China in a way that 
protects the well-being of the people on Taiwan. The 
importance of this is fully reflected in the arrangements 
that we have been and will be establishing. 
First, the United Stat~s will not abrogate the Mutual 
Defense Treaty. Rather, we have given noti ce that we will 
exercise our right to terminate the Treaty with Taiwan in 
accordance with its provisions, which permits t e rmination by 
either party after one year's not ice. All other treaties 
and agree~ents will remain in e f fect. 
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second is the critical question of the peaceful 
settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese them-
selves. It is clear from the actions and statements of 
the PRC in the last month that normalization has, in fact, 
enhanced the po s s i b i 1 it i e s that w h a t ever the u 1 t i mate 
resolution of the issue may be, . it will be pursued by 
peaceful means. ! · 
Since the normalization of relations, the PRC has 
adopted a markedly more moderate tone on the Taiwan issue: 
On January 9 of this year, Vice Premier Deng 
told Senators Nunn, Glenn, Hart and CoheP., that, "The social 
system on Taiwan will be decided by the people of Taiwan. 
Changes might take 100 years or 1, 000 years. By which I 
mean a long time. We will not change the society by 
force." 
On New Year's Day, after 25 years, the 
PRC ceased firing propaganda artillery shells at the of£-
shore islands of Quemoy and Matsu. 
Third and finally, after the termination of the 
Mutual Defense Treaty on December 31, 1979, we will con-
tinue our previous policy of selling carefully selected 
defensive weapons to Taiwan. While the PRC said they 
disapproved of this, they nevertheless moved forward 
with normalization with full knowledge of our intentions. 
In constructing a new relationship with the people 
on Taiwan, we are taking practical steps to ensure con-
tinuity of trade, cultural, and other unofficial relations. 
The President has taken steps to assure the uninterrupted 
continuation of such relations from January 1, 1979. In the 
future these relations will be conducted through a non-
profit non-governnental corporation called the American 
Institute in Taiwan. This corporation will facilitate 
ongoing, and we are confident, expanding ties between the 
American people and the people on Taiwan. Taipei will 
handle its unofficial relations with this country in similar 
fashion. 
Let me say a word or two about the American Insti-
tute in Taiwan, the legislation it requires, and its oper-
ations. Congress wi 11 be asked to approve an omnibus bill 
that will authorize the funding of the American Institute in 
Taiwan and confirm its authority to act in a wide range of 
areas. I hope we will have your active support for ex-
peditious passage of that bill. 
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The Institute will have its headquarters in Wash-
ington with field offices in Taiwan. It will provide the 
full range of commercial and other services that have been 
previously provided through official channels to business-
men, both from the United States and from Taiwan. In your 
private business dealings on Taiwan, you may freely contact 
the Institute's staff for advice or can deal directly with 
local firms and the authorities ther¢. In short, we see no 
change necessary in the way private American business has 
been conducted on Taiwan up to now. EXIM loans, OPIC 
guarantees and other important arrangements will continue. 
With these new arrangements in place, we expect 
Taiwan to continue to prosper. Taiwan's dynamic economic 
growth is one of the most impressive stories of the last 
decade~ it is now our eighth largest trading partner, 
and per capita income is among the highest in Asia. 
As anyone who has studied the issue can attest, nor-
malization of relations with Pekinq was not an easy step to 
take. The d iff icul ties always argued for themselves, and 
further delay was always an inviting option for any Presi-
dent. But we all recognized that sooner or later we would 
have to move. As I have already said, failure to try to 
move forward would have left us in danger of moving back-
wards -- at great cost to our global position. By the time 
we took the decisive step every other member of NATO, our 
two treaty partners in ANZUS, and Japan had long since 
recognized the PRC, as had most other nations of the world. 
They were ready for our action -- and most of them, in-
cluding all the members of the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations, applauded it. 
When we acted, we did so in a way that enhances 
significantly the prospects for stability and peace in Asia 
and the Pacific. We acted in a way that will move us 
towards our objective of a stable system of independent 
nations in Asia, and that will also increase the chances of 
maintaining a stable equilibrium among the United States, 
Japan, China, and the Soviet Union. 
The United States will continue to play an active 
role in order to maintain that stable equilibrium. For 
reasons of geography, history a nd economics, we are as much 
a Pacific nation as an Atlantic nation, with deep and 
abiding national interests in the region. We will maintain 
balanced and flexible military forces in the region, as the 
recent, successful conclusion of the base agreements with 
the Philippines so c l early demonstrates. And we will not 
hesitate to act, as required, to ?rotec t our vital national 
interests. 
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The rapidly expanding relations between our two 
nations in science, trade and exchanges require the kind of 
structure that diplomatic relations can provide. It 
will allow a much freer exchange between our cultures. 
And with full relations, we are in ;a far better position to 
encourage China's role as a constructive member of the world 
community. We will be discussing all of these matters with 
Vice Premier Deng when he visits us in two weeks. 
It is particularly usefu l on this occasion to note 
some of the economic benefits we expect to flow from the 
establishment of diplomatic relations with the PRC. These 
include our participation as a regular supplier of agri-
cultural commodities to China, the ability of u.s. exporters 
to compete on an equal basis with other suppliers, and the 
resumption of shipping, air, banking, and other normal 
economic relations with China. 
Let me emphasize that in normalizing relations we 
acted in a way that does not threaten any other nation, but 
can increase the sense of community of nations that we seek 
to encourage. 
We believe that China has an important role to play 
in the search for global peace and stability. The same is 
true for the Soviet Union. Our national interests are best 
served when we seek to improve relations with both nations 
while protecting our vi tal s tra teg ic interests. This was 
the case during the late winter and spring of 1972, a period 
during which both the Shanghai Communique and SALT I were 
achieved. Equilibrium and stability, not isolation, are our 
strategic objectives. For this reason, we also look forward 
to the early conclusion of the SALT agreement with the 
Soviet Union and to improvement of our trade relations with 
the Soviets as well as the Chinese. 
In conclusion, let JTle urge you to support the Pres i-
dent' s decision and the legislation to continue relations 
with the people on Taiwan. We seek your support in ex-
plaining the strategic and historic necessity of this 
action. And we encourage you to develop greater trade and 
contact with both the People's Republic of China and the 
people on Taiwan. 
It was just short of seven years from the Shanghai 
Communique to normalization of relations. Through a diffi-
cult period, two great nations began to restore contact and 
shape a new relationship. We a ::.. l recognize that a new era 
is upon us. Opportunities previously denied to us have 
now begun to take shape. 
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The nations grouped in and around the world's lar-
gest ocean, the Pacific, contain close to half the world's 
population. These nations must decide whether to choose the 
path of greater cooperation and growth or to enter into a 
period of unresolved struggles for influence. 
For our part, the United Stat~s will enter the closing 
decades of the 20th century ready to play a leading role in 
the search for peace and economic well-being. The lack 
of diplomatic relations between the United States and 
China was an obstacle to progress for many years. Having now 
surmounted it, we face the tremendous challenge ahead with a 
sense of excitement and hope. 
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